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Background: For years there has been a tremendous gap in our understanding of the mental health effects of
deployment and the efforts by military forces at trying to minimize or mitigate these. Many military forces
have recently systematized the mental support that is provided to support operational deployments. However,
the rationale for doing so and the consequential allocation of resources are felt to vary considerably across
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) International Security Assistance (ISAF) partners. This review
aims to compare the organization and practice of mental support by five partnering countries in the recent
deployment in Afghanistan in order to identify and compare the key methods and structures for delivering
mental health support, describe bottlenecks and illustrate new developments.
Method: Information was collected through document analysis and semi-structured interviews with key
military mental healthcare stakeholders. The review resulted from close collaboration between key military
mental healthcare professionals within the Australian Defense Forces (ADF), Canadian Armed Forces
(CAF), United Kingdom Armed Forces (UK), Netherlands Armed Forces (NLD), and the United States
Army (US). Key stakeholders were interviewed about the mental health support provided during a
serviceperson’s military career. The main items discussed were training, prevention, early identification,
intervention, and aftercare in the field of mental health.
Results: All forces reported that much attention was paid to mental health during the individual’s military
career, including deployment. In doing so there was much overlap between the rationale and applied methods.
The main method of providing support was through training and education. The educative focus was to
strengthen the mental resilience of individual soldiers while providing a range of mental healthcare services.
All forces had abandoned standard psychological debriefing after critical incidents. Instead, by default,
mental healthcare professionals acted to support the leader and peer led ‘‘after action’’ reviews. All countries
provided professional mental support close to the front line, aimed at early detection and early return to
normal activities within the unit. All countries deployed a mental health support team that consisted of a
range of mental health staff including psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, mental health nurses, and
chaplains. There was no overall consensus in the allocation of mental health disciplines in theatre. All
countries (except the US) provided troops with a third location decompression (TLD) stop after deployment,
which aimed to recognize what the deployed units had been through and to prepare them for transition
home. The US conducted in-garrison ‘decompression’, or ‘reintegration training’ in the US, with a similiar
focus to TLD. All had a reasonably comparable infrastructure in the field of mental healthcare. Shared
bottlenecks across countries included perceived stigma and barriers to care around mental health problems as
well as the need for improving the awareness and recognition of mental health problems among service
members.
Conclusion: This analysis demonstrated that in all five partners state-of-the-art preventative mental healthcare
was included in the last deployment in Afghanistan, including a positive approach towards strengthening
the mental resilience, a focus on self-regulatory skills and self-empowerment, and several initiatives that
were well-integrated in a military context. These initiatives were partly/completely implemented by the
military/colleagues/supervisors and applicable during several phases of the deployment cycle. Important new
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enhancement of operational peer support. This requires awareness of mental problems that will contribute to
reduction of the barriers to care in case of problems. Finally, comparing mental health support services across
countries can contribute to optimal preparation for the challenges of military deployment.
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D
eployment is an important part of every military
career and most service members return from
deployment with a sense of satisfaction. The
nature, objective, and operations tempo (OPSTEMPO)
of military missions has been highly variable during the
last century; however, most service personnel typically
participate in a series of deployments in their military
career. This OPSTEMPO as well as the burden of work-
ing in dangerous situations places demands on behavioral
or mental healthcare. Yet, despite improvements in pre-
deployment training and preparation over recent years,
some service members will return from deployment with
some cost to their health. The results can manifest in terms
of behavioral/physical and mental health (MH) problems,
as has been spelled out in various studies in relation
to the most recent deployments (Creamer, Burgess, &
McFarlane, 2001; Engelhard et al., 2007; Fear et al.,
2010; Hoge, Auchterlonie, & Milliken, 2006; Hoge
et al., 2008; Killgore et al., 2008; Vasterling et al., 2010;
Wittchen et al., 2012). The prevalence of persistent dis-
rupted sleep, headaches, fatigue, or symptoms associated
with other stresses and combat-related disorders such
as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), traumatic brain
injury (TBI), depression, or ill-defined health conditions
may vary across nations (Iversen et al., 2009; Kelsall
et al., 2009; Kok, Herrell, Thomas, & Hoge, 2012; Luxton
et al., 2011; Sareen et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2009;
Theeler, Mercer, & Erickson, 2008; Thomas et al., 2010)
but are not uncommon in any of them.
Most military organizations have professionalized be-
havioral and MH care they provide, in parallel to their
medical care. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
partners face similar challenges in deployment situations
such as in Afghanistan, and thus increasingly favor col-
laboration across countries in current behavioral and
MH practices. Recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan
have led to the deployment of military (field) hospitals
which are equipped with material and specialists, and in
tandem military MH services and disciplines operate in
the deployed environment to deliver care for the psycho-
logically injured soldier and to enact robust preventative
mental healthcare. Several nations have started strategies
to help service personnel overcome the stigma associated
with seeking psychological help and encourage appro-
priate help-seeking (Adler et al., 2013).
The goals of this study were to: (1) assess existing
protocols and current practices of MH support before,
during and after operational deployment, focusing on
prevention, intervention, and treatment; (2) provide a
comparative analysis of existing protocols and current
practices; and (3) identify common bottlenecks for effec-
tive MH support and promising future developments.
The focus was especially targeted on current practices
and new developments with regard to training programs,
interventions, and treatment procedures of military organi-
zation during and after deployment. However, when
service personnel are redeployed frequently MH support
after deployment becomes pre-deployment MH support.
Therefore, it was considered that MH support after deploy-
ment should be considered an integrated part of the
whole chain of MH support within the military organiza-
tion. Hence, for the purpose of this analysis we focused
on the complete chain of MH support, which included:
(1) stress management training (general education of
military personnel); (2) readiness training before deploy-
ment; (3) general MH support in-theatre; (4) interven-
tions after a potentially traumatic incident in-theatre;
(5) decompression, and (6) post-deployment MH support
(at home).
Method
Information was collected in 2010 by document analysis
and by interviewing key-stakeholders in the field of MH
support of each nation. Information was gathered on cur-
rent practices of MH service of five different countries,
all serving with major troop contributions in the recent
deployment in Afghanistan. The countries that were selec-
ted in this project were Australia (AM, AUS), Canada
(RJ, CAN), Great Britain (NG, GBR), the United States
of America (CC, US). Information from the Netherlands
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was performed through several leading commanders.
The chosen nations in this study have shared interests,
concerns, and needs because they were all active in the
NATO-ISAF mission in Afghanistan and the service
personnel of these nations were all exposed to similar
occupational hazards. We were aware that there are more
nations (whether active in Afghanistan or not) that have
similar needs. These nations were not excluded on any
formal grounds; we included the main players with the
largest contribution to the Afghanistan operations.
First, a semi-structured interview protocol, con-
structed using a Delphi method with the help of key
leaders within the NLD Armed Forces, was used for both
choosing the relevant topics for the interviews and
document analysis. Next, two levels of data-acquisition
were initiated. One was during formal meetings with MH
experts of the different nations, during public presenta-
tions and in one-on-one interviews for a duration of 12
hours in parallel to this. The second level was through a
formal request to the Surgeon Generals of the participat-
ing nations to review unclassified reports and existing
documentation. Both document analysis and interviews
were focused on the MH organization of the partner’s
Afghanistan mission as ISAF between the years 2008 and
2010. The Delhi method resulted in the identification
of six main topic areas to be assessed: (1) policies and
current practices regarding MH support and stress
management interventions; (2) underlying (scientific,
cultural, logistic, or otherwise-based) rationale behind
these policies and practices; (3) operational procedures
after the occurrence of a traumatic incidents (e.g., impro-
vised explosive devices [IEDs]); (4) operational proce-
dures after deployment; (4) policy related to OPSTEMPO;
(5) evaluation of these policies, operational procedures,
and interventions; and (6) future developments regard-
ing policies, procedures, and interventions (the semi-
structured interview format is available upon request).
Results
The current report describes the results of both the
document-review and semi-structured interviews. The
MH protocols and practices of the five different NATO-
partners are reported here. The deployment cycle is
illustrated in Fig. 1. Table 1 illustrates the mission, unit,
and MH characteristics across the participating nations.
The comparison was descriptive and more detailed com-
parison was not in the scope of this study. One of the
challenges in describing these interventions is the low
quality of systematic evidence about their effectiveness
(Institute of Medicine [IOM], 2014). This analysis
Fig. 1. The military deployment-cycle time-line of AUS, CAN, GBR, NLD, and USA for the NATO-ISAF Mission in
Afghanistan. This time-line is considered of interest, as it probably significantly influences the MH-cycle of service members;
that is, going from being in balance/resilient after pre-deployment training, to getting injured by stress in-theatre, back to
becoming in balance again during R&R or decompression.
Mental Health Organization across NATO partners
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Table 1. The mission, unit and MH characteristics of AUS, CAN, GBR, NLD, and USA for the NATO-ISAF mission in Afghanistan





deployed Scheduled R&R Unit demographics
Length of time together
before deployment
Continuity of unit




Regular Army 6 to
8 mo.




SOC and aircrew can
do roughly 4 months
per calendar year.
Minimal interval for all




ADF total full time
staff is  55,000.
For missions 6 mo.
and over, members
get 10 days ROCL
available from the
half-way point of tour
through to last mo.
of tour.
Units consist of mainly






Depending on the type
of task of the unit, gender
may be balanced or
biased toward males.
Variable but formed units
usually together for a fair
while (mo. to yrs).
SF teams usually meet up
3 mo. before and do some
pre-mission training with
the Dutch.
RF units are relatively stable,
i.e., unit members are often
together for quite some time
before they leave on
deployment and they stay
together for multiple
operations. However, SF
teams are formed ad hoc for a
certain task and will also be
taken apart afterwards. Due to
this, SF teams have a shorter
lifetime.
CAN In 95% of the cases
service members will






deployed for 1 year.
The min interval
between missions is
1 year. If service
members volunteer
to go on next mission
earlier, they sign a
waiver. In practice,
the interval varies











In practice, this will
be between the 1st
and 4th month during
deployment. Service
members are 17
days away from the
mission area.







Depending on the type
of task of the unit,
gender may be balanced
or biased toward males.
Regular Force unit
members are together for
a long time, oftenyear.
Reserve unit members are
usually added later.
However, the whole unit is
together before
deployment at least 6
months (during pre-
deployment training).
The aim is to have a long unit
life time (i.e., multiple
deployments with same unit).
Nevertheless, augmentation
of units by Reserve members
does occur.

















14 days per 6 months
allowed*which
should allow 10 days
at home.
Very varied*all types of
units and specialist teams
are deployed.
Varies*the main combat
units are formed anyhow
and IR (individual
reinforcements) join such
units a few months before
deployment. Generally a
6 month reservist’s tour
would mean they were
mobilized for about a
year.
Personnel move between
units every 23 years.
Generally non-officers stay
within the same regimental
system (15 Battalions per
regiment) and officers
alternate between regimental
and other postings. However,









































































































Table 1 (Continued )





deployed Scheduled R&R Unit demographics
Length of time together
before deployment
Continuity of unit
(new members, life time)














2 weeks leave at
home.
Unit consists of regular
force. Varies in age and
experience. Depending
on type of task more
males.
There is a mission specific
preparation program for
approx 46 months.
Ideally, before this time unit
should be formed, but this
is not always possible.
Personnel change position
every 3 years. In addition,
after deployment some
service members leave
military and thus unit will
receive new members.
USA Typically 12 months for




months for Army, 8
months for Marines,
46 months for SF.
60,000 in
Afghanistan. In








to qualify for 14 days
mid-tour leave. With
deployments of 15
months it is 17 days.
For Army units comprise








Highly variable. Can range
from years to weeks.
Movement out of a unit
stops approx. 23 months
before deployment so
most Soldiers are together
for several months prior to
deploying, but there are
last minute fills, so Soldiers
can be very new to the unit.
Personnel move about every
3 years or so.






service members (which topics




Type of MH support provided
by MH team (type of screening/
de-briefing/therapies used)
Type of MH support






AUS Although the ADF
tries to identify
mission-specific




The ADF do not undertake pre-
deployment MH screening.




members are able to deploy or
not. Also, the results of post-
deployment MH assessments
of the last deployment are
used (RtAPs and POPS).





Training program) and a pre-








No standard in-theatre MH
screening or debriefing. CO
does operational debriefs. Self-
referral or by CO to MH team.
MH team can provide MH first
aid. For more formal treatment
ADF relies on MH professionals


































































































































Table 1 (Continued )






service members (which topics




Type of MH support provided
by MH team (type of screening/
de-briefing/therapies used)
Type of MH support











of MH team that
should join the













There is two-fold MH
screening:
MH inquiries are done during
annual physical.
Also, pre-deployment, each
service member is seen by a
MO who gives a ‘‘rating’’ for
deployability (green, yellow or
red). Moreover, a service
member is seen by an MH
nurse/SW, who focuses on




First, there is MH education
throughout the carrier by the
MH & Operational Stress Injury
Joint Speakers Bureau (MH &
OSI JBS). It is focused on
increasing MH and OSI
literacy, while targeting
attitudes and stigma around
MH.
Secondly, there is ‘‘Road to
Mental Readiness’’ (R2MR)
training before a mission. It is
focused on preparation for and
mitigation of the stresses of
operations and deployment. A
team of MH professionals and
trained peers delivers both
types of training, but in the
delivery the units’ own




















No in-theatre MH screening.
Service members may self-
refer to whom they want (no
barrier to referral). Usually, MH
nurse/SW does 1st
assessment and refers to
psychiatrist if needed. MH
nurse/SW focuses on family
matters and psychosocial
issues. Psychiatrist focuses on
formal diagnoses and
treatment. Case management
is always coordinated between
commander and MH team.
Therapy is usually CBT, but
may also be EMDR or
medication. There is no
standard critical incident
debriefing. However, if decided
necessary by the commander
and MO a tailor-made brief is
given.
During the MH & OSI
JBS carrier courses
and R2MR training









closely with MO and
MH team to support























Aim is to keep
individual with
unit as long as
possible since






plan. However, it is
acknowledged that
mission demands
may vary for the
None formally. Does not work.
Unit medical and welfare staff
discuss risky cases with
commanders and make
decisions.
All personnel should receive an
MH brief prior to deployment
and another short one in
theatre. Briefs given by






one of which is
No in-theatre screening or
debriefing. MH support
consists of liaison, formal















































































































Table 1 (Continued )






service members (which topics




Type of MH support provided
by MH team (type of screening/
de-briefing/therapies used)
Type of MH support















personnel. May include body-
handling information where
appropriate for tasking.











MH plan is made







No official screening. Unit
commanders and social
medical team of unit discuss
deployability of service
members.
All personnel attend pre-
deployment stress
management briefings given
by psychologist and SW.











No standard screening. No
standard debrief by MH
professionals, but MH
professionals are often present
at operational debrief. SW
focus on psychosocial
problems. Psychologist focus
on psychological problems and





















There is no official pre-
deployment screening to
assess fitness for deployment.
All medical records are
reviewed by the Brigade MO to
ensure medical fitness for
deployment.
Army receives pre-deployment
Battlemind which focuses on
the expectations of combat
and effective coping skills that












No standard debriefing by MH




entire spectrum, from unit MH
needs assessment to treatment















































































































































Table 1 (Continued )






service members (which topics




Type of MH support provided
by MH team (type of screening/
de-briefing/therapies used)
Type of MH support


















MH support in post-deployment phase
TLD
(how long, what main elements)
Follow-up and care by MH
professionals (screening, treatment, etc.) Follow-up and care by unit
MH services infrastructure
(clinics, networks, programs)
AUS None currently*maybe one day
on way out due to travel delays,
but see RtAPs in next column.
RtAPs (in non-combat area) before leaving
country; POPs at 3 month post-deployment.
RtAPS consists of three main parts:
 a group debrief on return from deployment
issues,
 psychological screening,
 interview with psychologist/psychological
examiner.
When a referral is needed command line is
notified. It depends on the screening output
whether a psychologist or psychological examiner
conducts the interview.
POPS consists of 2 main parts:
 self-report MH screening conducted by a
psychologist,
 interview with either psychologist/
psychological examiner to conduct a more
in-depth screening, and to address
adjustment issues, and provide information.
Service members who are encountering MH
problems are referred for counseling.
Nothing formal*COs and mates;
buddy support
Up to 2009, the DMH used Regional MH Teams (RMHT)
to obtain its goals: These are present in places where
there are large concentrations of service members.
RMHT are multi-disciplinary bodies comprised of
representatives from the range of ADF MH services.
RMHT promote treatment programs, manage complex
cases, coordinate local networks, provide outpatient
care, deliver critical incident MH support on demand and
coordinate prevention strategies/programs. At unit level,
MH support is provided by MOs and general
practitioners, who will provide a large part of (first level)
MH support. At large bases an MH Unit will be available
that can provide advanced MH support. An MHU
consists of a MO and a psychologist. Also, chaplains are
present on most bases. In addition, ADF is supported by
contracted psychologists and psychiatrists.
Veteran Services provides MH support to veterans (and
their families). Defense Community Organisation delivers








































































































Table 1 (Continued )
MH support in post-deployment phase
TLD
(how long, what main elements)
Follow-up and care by MH
professionals (screening, treatment, etc.) Follow-up and care by unit
MH services infrastructure
(clinics, networks, programs)
CAN There is a mandatory TLD at
Cyprus. It is 3 days with 2 extra
days for travel. It consists of a few
obligatory MH briefings and a set
of educational briefings of which
two have to be selected. Besides
this, there are several subsidized
R&R activities available.
Standard screening-process, in the form of a
survey 90180 days post-deployment. It consists
of a set of standard health questionnaires
(including one on PTSD symptoms) followed by an
in-depth interview with an MH professional. It
attempts to trace people with deployment related
MH problems. Also, there is a mandatory (annual)
period health assessment.
Once diagnosed with an OSI an individual will be
followed by one of the OTSSCs until full remission.
In case there is no full remission, there is a good
transition to the VAC.
In-garrison MH support is covered partly by
military, civilian and contracted MH professionals.
All sorts of treatments are used: CBT, EMDR,
medication.
After TLD, unit goes back to work
for 3 half days before unit
members can go on a leave. This
is implemented as an additional
‘‘decompression’’ in order to
make an optimal transition to
home/base life.
Besides the support from own
buddies and commander, there is
an Operational Stress Injury
Social Support (OSISS) network,
i.e., a peer support network of
former operational stress injuries
survivors. This is a joint activity
with VAC in close collaboration
with the OTSSCs.
MH care is delivered at CF Health Care Clinics across
Canada. CF MH Services consists of two distinct
services: Psychosocial Services and MH Services.
Psychosocial Services comprise a basic level of MH care
and is staffed by nurses, SWs and addictions counselors.
This program is fully confidential for which no referral
from a physician/MO is needed. This program is available
at all clinics. MH Services consists of specialized
programs such as: the OTSSC program that focuses on
treatment of operational injuries, the MH program which
focuses on general MH conditions and the Addiction
program. For these programs a referral of a physician/
MO is required. An interdisciplinary staff of
psychologists, psychiatrists, MH nurses, SWs,
addictions counselors and Health Services chaplains
provides Service. These secondary programs are located
at the larger centers.
GBR 36 hours. 1 hour of MH briefings.
Padre and psychiatric nurse on
hand for informal support.
All homecoming personnel see
coming home DVD which is
designed to protect MH (DVD MH
training).
No formal screening. All personnel re-briefed/
talked to 12 weeks after coming home. No formal
MH care provided unless needed.
As previous box. Commanders
also responsible for on-going
concern about the psychological
welfare of their subordinates.
TRiM also available in units for
informal support.
Many MH cases are handled entirely within military
primary care; cases requiring formal MH input are
referred to the nearest Department of Community MH
site. These DsCMH provide UK-wide coverage and are
staffed with a multi-disciplinary team of psychiatrists,
nurses, psychologists and SWs. Referral goes via unit
MOs.
NLD Mandatory 2 or 3 days TLD on
Crete, consists of leisure
activities and group discussion
with MH debrief.
After 3 months: post-deployment interview with
SW or chaplain
After 6 months: post-deployment MH screening
questionnaire
Both can be followed-up by referral to MH
professional, i.e., SW, psychologist, psychiatrist.
Personnel can self-refer or be referred by
commander to MH professional.
All sorts of treatments are provided.
Commanders are responsible for
MH of personnel. They can
support adjustment by
recuperation exercise (leisure and
group discussion to provide
closure of deployment) or
reintegration exercise (support
adjustment into new unit/with
new unit members).
MO and SWs are available in garrison. They can provide
support for psychosocial problems and light
psychological treatment.
Psychologist and psychiatrist are based in specialist MH
centers providing psychological treatment. When
necessary referrals to private institutions with specific


























































































































provides a qualitative outline of these programs to assist
in their further refinement and investigation.
MH practices during the pre-deployment phase
Deployment-specific MH health care plan
Most of the participating partners underscored that MH
risk and needs assessment for each substantial deploy-
ment was essential for success of the operation. The risks
to personnel and the possible mental health impact vary
from peacekeeper to combat missions. This required a
tailored program to be put in place that was based on the
outcome of the risk assessment. For example, the hazards
in some missions need to focus more on dealing with
extremes of suffering and dealing with mass graves than
the immediate strains of combat. The advantage of this
practice was that the required training for service per-
sonnel, command line, and the MH support team could
be tailored to the specific mission, to enhance preventa-
tive effects. Also, the type and number of MH profes-
sionals could be adjusted to the specific mission, which
aimed to ensure early detection and treatment for emer-
gent MH problems among service personnel. Nations
intended that carrying out a pre-deployment mission-
specific MH risk and needs assessment would limit
‘‘surprises’’ during a mission by ensuring that proper
MH measures were in place. Nevertheless, undertaking
such an assessment and doing various adjustments placed
an additional load on the general MH support system
of a military organization. If the general MH support
system did not have enough resources to carry out the
risk assessment, the collective impression was that it
might be wiser not to undertake this effort since it could
diminish the quality of the MH support actually deliv-
ered. Instead, when resources in the system were limited
it was considered wiser to have a flexible approach and
adjust MH support on the basis of risks and needs. An
option was to fly in an MH support team for care or for
post-mission MH training and screening.
MH screening in service personnel
None of the partners undertook formal MH screening
in the immediate pre-deployment period. However, it
should be emphasized that there are extensive selection
processes in selection for combat corps and most front
line roles that is a form of screening. Predeployment
medical assessments have normal procedures that pro-
vide a setting to detect frank disorders. Yet, new studies
provided new findings for predeployment screening.
First, there was no evidence for clear indicators on which
screening could be based; second, the predictive value of
MH screening using, for example, psychological ques-
tionnaires was not supported by evidence; and third,
screening could have negative effects on the career and
MH well-being of service personnel (Hyams, 2006; Rona
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for signs that certain service personnel may be unfit
(currently) for deployment, for instance by conversations
of colleagues, commanders, chaplains or medical/MH
staff. The interviews suggested that commanders and
chaplains should be trained to ensure that they were
aware of MH issues and should ensure that they talk to
service personnel regularly.
MH education/training in service personnel
The importance of MH education throughout the career
as well as pre-deployment MH training was generally
accepted among partners and in literature (Adler et al.,
2013; Mulligan et al., 2012; Mulligan, Fear, Jones,
Wessely, & Greenberg, 2011). Such trained aimed to en-
sure MH literacy: that is, knowing how to recognize
MH problems of yourself/peers/subordinates; having pro-
per coping skills; knowing how to support others and
where to go/refer for formal help if needed. However,
those interviewed were aware that evidence supporting
its use was sparse although it was thought that it could
boost resiliency and thus work preventatively. Finally,
military forces hoped the training would decrease stigma
and with it the barriers to MH care. Review of the
MH education and training led to observations in
which: (1) giving priority to a comprehensive educational
approach that uses an MH continuum model with other
connected programs encompassing the whole deploy-
ment life-cycle, aimed at all ranks as well as all family
members (Adler et al., 2013; Castro, Adler, McGurk,
& Bliese, 2012); (2) it was felt important to not only
use briefings/presentations that were passively absorbed;
instead using interactive exercises with service personnel
such as guided group discussions assures larger effect
on service personnel; (3) integrating MH training in
(stressful) operational practices makes it more tangible
for service personnel to appreciate how to put the train-
ing into practice. The partners agreed that a comprehen-
sive approach which is provided across the deployment
life-cycle and integrated in operational practices ensures
that MH ‘‘fitness,’’ like physical fitness, becomes part
of daily military operations. Such an approach requires
commanders and peers, as well as healthcare profes-
sionals, to be involved in the delivery of MH training and
education. Some elements are better delivered by MH
professionals such as guided group discussion, since they
have the theoretical and practical (communicative) MH
experience needed for this. However, stress-management
training as part of operational tasks is thought to best
be delivered by commanders or peers. Commanders and
peers are better able to present a credible, maybe more
technical, logistic training package because they are
able to relate to the strategic and operational impact of
the mission.
Main MH practices in-theatre
Support provided by the unit/commander
All partners were in agreement that in the various MH
educational sessions delivered during their career, service
personnel needed to be taught to look after each other.
MH ‘‘buddy care’’ was facilitated by teaching personnel
to take note of signals of distress in colleagues, to be
able to support to each other and, where appropriate,
to encourage a colleague to discuss concerns with their
commander, chaplain, MO or SW/MH nurse. In general,
it was the command line that received training on re-
cognition of MH issues, on giving advice, and adjusting
leadership and referral. Furthermore, it was considered
that it was a primary role of leaders to ensure that service
personnel know how to access help during operations
and to promote an environment where people are en-
couraged to access support when needed and give sup-
port to each other. This was also promoted through
leadership courses advocating optimal leadership beha-
vior and attitudes. The important and influential role of
leaders on the coping of subordinates during missions has
been supported by various studies (Bartone, Adler, &
Vaitkus, 1998; Britt, Adler, & Bartone, 2001; Castro
et al., 2012; Jones et al., 2012). A specific example of
MH education aimed at a proper support system in the
unit was the suicide awareness and prevention training.
Such training is aimed to increase skills among personnel
with respect to the detection of risk factors, providing
MH first aid and suicide prevention.
Type of briefing after a potentially critical incident
All partners had formally abandoned single session
psychological (critical incident) debriefing. This was a
recent corrective measure that all partners had taken,
based on the empirical evaluation of this practice in the
public non-military domain that (despite the non-military
setting of negative effects on MH, especially for those
who were the most visibly distressed (see for a meta-
analysis (van Emmerik, Kamphuis, Hulsbosch, &
Emmelkamp, 2002). Amidst these developments battle-
mind debriefing and battlemind training are new emerging
concepts (Adler, Bliese, McGurk, Hoge, & Castro, 2009).
The current paradigm shared among partners is that
commanders give an operational debrief after exercises
and incidents, so called after ‘‘action review.’’ This in-
cludes that commanders, chaplains, and MH profes-
sionals practice ‘‘watchful waiting,’’ which implies that
they try to stimulate the natural recovery processes by
advocating that service personnel are experiencing nor-
mal stress reactions to an abnormal event, that normal-
ization/readjustment is possible and expected, and that
rest/food/clean clothes/getting support of unit members/
calling support group home will engender this. When
‘‘battlemind psychological debriefing’’ was integrated
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into a larger ‘‘battlemind training system’’ the brief early
interventions demonstrated to be effective with these
groups. The word debriefing has been abandoned. For all
partners these more specialized debriefings are primarily
aimed at early detection and fast normalization of MH
problems after experiencing trauma.
It is important to note that in case of a severe critical
incident (with injuries or casualties), commanders can
upscale MH support. In fact, across partners it was con-
sidered the responsibility of commanders, to decide whether
a more specialized debriefing was recommended after
severe incidents (Adler, Bliese, et al., 2009). All partners
had protocols for these so called more ‘‘specialized’’
debriefings. Some partners involved an MH professional
in this, to do/be present during a guided group-discussion
or an educational brief. GBR typically did not involve
MH professionals. Instead, they built on a new approach
developed within the UK Royal Marines, known as Trauma
Risk Management (TRiM) (Greenberg, Langston, &
Jones, 2008). Characteristic of TRiM is that it is carried
out within the unit by designated serving military per-
sonnel, who received a short training. TRiM members
do work closely with the commander and MO. While
this approach is very promising, there is currently a need
for more evidence for its implementation (Greenberg
et al., 2010; Hunt, Jones, Hastings, & Greenberg, 2013).
Other countries are now also exploring to implement
elements of this approach.
MH screening
None of the partners undertook in-theatre MH screen-
ing for the same reasons they did not undertake pre-
deployment MH screening. AUS did report to conduct
re-deployment screening.
MH team available
For all participating partners, the in-theatre MH team/
unit consisted of one or more MH nurses/SWs, one or
more chaplains, and an MH specialist. Some partners
(CAN, US) deployed psychiatrists, but others (NLD,
AUS) deployed psychologists only. The USA deployed all
specialties, including psychiatrists, psychologists, social
workers, and psychiatric nurses since these occupations
comprise the mental healthcare team. Having an MH
team or unit available in the deployment area was thought
to have advantages such as minimizing barriers to care,
facilitating early detection of MH problems and provid-
ing field treatment in order to keep service personnel with
problems part of the unit and mission where possible.
Such an approach was found beneficial for the individual
and organization (see more details next section). How-
ever, it is important that MH teams/units are easy
accessible. Accessibility was easier when the MH team/
unit is organic to the unit compared to when there is one
MH team/unit per mission area. Further, it was accepted
among partners that having a multidisciplinary team
available is important. Familiarity of the MH providers
with the unit and the military context was felt to have a
positive effect on effectiveness. And finally, having a good
communication between different support providers (i.e.,
MO, SW, MH professionals, and commanders) was also
deemed an important factor across partners. However,
a MH support system was thought to require sufficient
properly trained personnel to send (complete) MH teams
to mission areas. If not, it was considered not advanta-
geous to try to deploy (complete) MH teams during the
whole mission, since it could compromise the quality of
rear-party MH care. In this case it was thought it might
be better to take a flexible approach and send out MH
teams/specific specialists at major critical incidents and/
or repatriate individual service personnel needing more
formal MH support for treatment at home.
MH treatment and repatriation
The approach of frontline intervention or ‘‘forward
psychiatry,’’ first introduced in World War I, was still
practiced among partners (Jones & Wessely, 2003). This is
in line with the approach adopted after potentially critical
incidents (see above), since it means treating distressed
personnel as quickly as possible, as close to the frontline
as possible, and in many cases persuading them that their
reactions area normal physiological response to the stress
of battle, and that after a few days of rest, sleep, clean
clothes, and hot food, he/she will be able to resume his/
her military duties. This approach was substantiated
by evidence showing that soldiers receiving treatment in
a forward unit have lower rates of PTSD and other
psychiatric symptoms, experienced less loneliness and
report better social functioning compared to similarly
traumatized soldiers treated in rear units (Jones, Fear,
Jones, Wessely, & Greenberg, 2010; Solomon, Mikulincer,
& Waysman, 1991; Solomon, Mikulincer, Waysman, &
Marlowe, 1991; Solomon, Shklar, & Mikulincer, 2005).
The ‘‘forward psychiatry’’ approach has gradually been
replaced with ‘‘embedded mental health’’ that is organic
to the unit. During WWII this was not the case, at least in
the US. The embedded teams augmented the organic
assets, as well as provided recuperative care, which is still
‘‘forward.’’ In line with this approach, all partners made
efforts to treat personnel with MH issues in theatre.
There were differences in the types of treatments
provided in-theatre. Some nations provided a minimal
service such as psychological first aid while other nations
provided a full spectrum (i.e., cognitive behavioral
therapy [CBT], and eye movement desensitization and
reprocessing [EMDR] and various forms of medication).
Service provision was very much dependent on the type
of MH providers available in-theatre for the delivery of
treatment. Most partners considered it the responsibility
of the commander to decide whether someone should
repatriate in consultation with either the MO or the MH
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team. This decision was dependent on severity of illness
(i.e., whether more formal/inpatient treatment is re-
quired), individual’s response to treatment, specific job,
and risk of staying versus risk of leaving.
MH practices during the post-deployment phase
Decompression
All participating countries in this study had some sort of
decompression period before service personnel could go
on leave. The general definition used was that decom-
pression is a formal way to recognize and reward the
deployed troops for their experiences and begin to restore
them to deploy again or return to civilian life. Decom-
pression programs were conducted outside of and mostly
immediately after leaving the theatre of operations and
without family members. However, there were differences
among partners in the precise context in which decom-
pression was done. Several partners used ‘‘holiday-type’’
third locations (e.g., Cyprus or Crete). While it was a
practice used by several partners there was no evidence
yet to support its use (Jones et al., 2013). A holiday-type
third location had the advantage of providing a good rest
and recuperation (R&R) environment that facilitates
unwinding of service personnel. On the other hand, doing
decompression in a non-combat area in the country of
deployment could allow better recapturing of experiences
and closure of undisclosed/unresolved issues.
There were also differences among partners in the
amount and type of MH sessions/elements during decom-
pression. Generally, MH briefings and presentations were
used to psycho-educate service personnel on potential
issues during the adjustment at home. However, if these
were not combined by guided discussions it remained
unsure how service personnel perceived the messages in
the briefings and presentations and whether they gained
insight/skills. Research also suggested that these presen-
tations can have a lasting effect on the mental health of
service personnel (Adler, Bliese, et al., 2009; Castro et al.,
2012; Mulligan et al., 2012).
Although, all participating countries had both MH
providers and peers (acting on behalf of the chain of
command) available, the precise role these persons played
in the delivery of MH elements varied. There was con-
sensus that both should play an important part during
decompression. MH professionals could be important for
their theoretical and practical MH experience while peers
could serve as a better role model for proper coping
(‘‘making sense’’) of deployment and they were up to
date about the specific events a unit experienced during
deployment. Back home, some partners sent units back
to work several (half) days of what is termed ‘‘normal-
ization,’’ before they could go on a leave. This was
considered part of operational stress management and,
like decompression, had the purpose of not losing sight of
each other immediately, and detection and addressing of
potential adjustment problems.
Follow-up by MH professionals
The type and length of MH follow-up varied among
partners. Only GBR had no formal MH follow-up post-
deployment although it was currently engaged on a ran-
domized controlled trial of post deployment screening.
The relatively low prevalence of PTSD, as established
by the health surveillance research conducted by the
KCMHR, together with the low specificity of PTSD
screening measures, was used as rationale for not under-
taking screening pre-, during or post-deployment (KCMHR
10 year report). Long-term detection of operational stress
injury was considered the responsibility of the individual
serviceman, commanders, colleagues, and family. GBR
did have routine, periodic, and special medical examina-
tions of individual’s known to have returned from an
operational deployment. MOs were instructed to be alert
for signals of psychological injury. Screening measures
in MO/GP settings had been shown to improve rates
of detection and outcomes, so there was potential to
question this non-interventionist approach.
The other partners did use some form of MH follow-
up post-deployment, usually between 3 and 6 months
after return. The procedures differed however. Several
studies showed that the impact of combat can be severe
and long lasting and often follows a complex course
(Solomon, Shklar, Singer, & Mikulincer, 2006). While
delayed-onset PTSD (i.e., the development of PTSD
more than 6 months post-trauma) is generally character-
ized by partial or subsyndromal diagnoses within the first
6 months, there are individuals who develop PTSD after
more than 6 months who do not meet the criteria for
partial or subsyndromal PTSD before that (Andrews,
Brewin, Philpott, & Stewart, 2007; Carty, O’Donnell,
& Creamer, 2006; Goodwin et al., 2012; Solomon &
Mikulincer, 2006). There is a percentage showing exacer-
bations or reactivations of prior symptoms after more
than 6 months. Given that over 20% of individuals who
develop PTSD have the delayed form, there is evidence of
the need to undertake longer follow-up than 6 months to
detect delayed, exacerbated or reactivated PTSD symp-
toms in annual medical assessments (Horesh, Solomon,
Zerach, & Ein-Dor, 2011; Smid, Kleber, Rademaker,
van Zuiden, & Vermetten, 2013; Smid, Mooren, van der
Mast, Gersons, & Kleber, 2009). A further benefit of
screening is that it makes mental health questions more
familiar and introduces military personnel to direct
contact with a mental health provider.
Modern warfare is characterized by a ‘‘new’’ weapon,
that is, the IED with a ‘signature wound’, which is
(m)TBI. The interest for this blast related (m)TBI as
was introduced by the US was also reflected by an enor-
mous popularity for this new disorder and its treatment.
Mental Health Organization across NATO partners
Citation: European Journal of Psychotraumatology 2014, 5: 23732 - http://dx.doi.org/10.3402/ejpt.v5.23732 13
(page number not for citation purpose)
A recent Medline-evaluation by Wallace (2009) from
20012008 substantiated that IED-related (m)TBI can
not be ignored as one of the most important injuries
associated with current military missions. There is high
overlap with symptoms of PTSD, which contributed to
strong debates about diagnosis (Creamer, O’Donnell, &
Pattison, 2005; Ruff, Riechers, & Ruff, 2010; Vanderploeg,
Belanger, & Curtiss, 2009), symptom trajectory (Bryant,
O’Donnell, Creamer, McFarlane, & Silove, 2013), and
optimal treatment (Davis, Walter, Chard, Parkinson, &
Houston, 2013). In our review material, there was an
increased focus across partners on proper detection and
treatment of soldiers having obtained (m)TBI due to
blasts of IEDs during their deployment and recognition
for multidisciplinary collaborative care models of treat-
ment in primary care to collectively address the full
spectrum of postwar physical and neurocognitive health
concerns (Wilk, Herrell, Wynn, Riviere, & Hoge, 2012).
This was accomplished through a combination of re-
search, educational programs, and policy development.
With respect to the MH support infrastructure avail-
able, it can be concluded that all partners had multiple
services in place for rear-party MH support. Generally,
first-line MH support was delivered by MOs and MH
nurses/SWs, who are usually available at local bases. For
more formal (second-line) case management all partners
had specialized clinics/centers available having multi-
disciplinary MH teams. Formal MH support was deliv-
ered by psychologists or psychiatrists and consists of
a wide spectrum of treatments. For PTSD, general CBT
and EMDR were the standard treatments. However, medi-
cation was sometimes also given. Further, all partners
had services (programs) in place for addressing other
problems such as AD, alcohol/drug abuse, depression,
and suicide. Although there was an effort to have MH
support delivered primarily by uniformed MH pro-
fessionals, both contracted and/or standard civil MH
services are relied on to some extent by all partners.
Follow-up and care by unit/commander
None of the partners had standardized follow-up by the
unit or commander after a mission. However, it was
acknowledged that buddies and leaders have an impor-
tant role in detecting of MH issues, facilitating natural
recovery (making sense and proper coping) after an
intense deployment, giving support/advise and guiding
peers/subordinates to formal support if needed. Some
partners offered commanders the opportunity to imple-
ment a non-arduous enjoyable military exercise combined
with psycho-education and/or group discussion to ad-
dress these issues. Proper dealing with these issues was
also stimulated by MH education and pre-deployment train-
ing packages. For example, there was the ‘‘Battlemind
training’’ (Adler, Castro, & McGurk, 2009; Castro et al.,
2012) introduced by the USA that has the objective to
mentally prepare soldiers for the rigors of combat and
other aspects of military deployments, to assist them in
their successful transition back home and to provide
the skills to assist their ‘‘Battle Buddy’’ in the transition
to home. This type of training became popular among
partners (see, e.g., ‘‘BattleSMART’’ training of AUS and
‘‘Road to Mental Readiness’’ training of CAN). If there
was a proper climate (no stigma and proper MH knowl-
edge and skills available) there would be no need for
standardized follow-up by the commander/unit, as the
unit was considered a natural support system. Yet, this
may be too idealistic as some reports suggest (Hoge et al.,
2004). Most partners had some sort of peer support
groups/networks in place. The opinion was that good
peer support, with trained peers liaising with MH pro-
fessionals, was found crucial in a good support system
(Keller et al., 2005; Pfeiffer et al., 2012). As it is rooted
in the military context, it is thought to be helpful in
diminishing the remaining stigma around having MH
issues and offers a lower barrier to care. However, psycho-
education, resilience training, and the effectiveness of
peer support systems still are to be supported by rigorous
evidence, despite the broad acceptance of these roles
(Greenberg, Langston, Iversen, & Wessely, 2011).
Common bottlenecks for military MH care
Military MH care has come a long way and has reached
an established status that more than ever meets the
criteria for state of the art services. Nevertheless, several
common bottlenecks in current practices are worthwhile
to discuss, since from this discussion promising future
developments can be inferred that may lead to more
effective military MH care, assuring its state of the art-
status. Main common bottlenecks/needs and suggested
promising developments will be discussed.
Barriers to MH care
The first and most important common bottleneck for
effective MH support was the barrier to MH care. This
was partly explained by the fact that there is still a stigma
around experiencing MH issues during/after deployment
among serving personnel that prevents them from seeking
treatment (Gould et al., 2010; Hoge et al., 2004). Military
organizations encourage self-reliance and resilience, ap-
propriately to the nature of the task of service personnel.
Experiencing MH problems was often seen as a failure of
self-reliance and was associated with shame and guilt
(Greene-Shortridge, Britt, & Castro, 2007; Kim, Thomas,
Wilk, Castro, & Hoge, 2010; Pietrzak et al., 2009).
Admitting to an MH disorder was viewed as a cause of
disapproval from peers. Also, service personnel were
reported to be afraid of the negative effects it may have
on their career in the military. Another critical factor was
the fact that counseling (such as CBT) relied heavily on
verbal skills. Many service personnel would not find this
very attractive or even fearful, because they were not used
Eric Vermetten et al.
14
(page number not for citation purpose)
Citation: European Journal of Psychotraumatology 2014, 5: 23732 - http://dx.doi.org/10.3402/ejpt.v5.23732
to talking about problems, instead they are often more
action-oriented. This aspect of counseling might there-
fore hinder service personnel from seeking MH support,
prompt them to terminate their treatment prematurely or
render it less effective. This asks for new methods/tools
that go around talking about MH problems, with a
positive resilience approach and that better fit military
context as this would all lower the barrier to care.
Availability of MH care providers
The second common bottleneck for effective MH support
was an insufficient availability of MH care providers. This
was partly explained by the fact that in missions such
as the current one in Afghanistan, MH care personnel
is highly dispersed due to the geography of the country.
Another aspect was a simple shortage in MH profes-
sionals, especially uniformed psychiatrists and psycholo-
gists. These professionals were difficult to recruit and
keep. Related to this is the finding that primary care level
was sometimes inefficient, because MOs, GPs, and SWs
lacked specific clinical training and skills. This asks
for new tools that focus on self-empowerment of service
personnel, that is, that train service personnel in how to
recognize and normalize MH problems by themselves/in
the unit as this would lower the dependency on the scarce
MH care providers.
Correspondence between the MH support system
and deployment life-cycle
An optimal Military MH support system needs to have
a seamless correspondence with the cyclic character of
deployments. This implies: (1) adequate mental resil-
iency building training pre-deployment; (2) MH support
focusing on fast normalization in-theatre and during
decompression; and (3) adequate MH follow-up post-
deployment. Together this was hoped to lower the chance
that service personnel will experience MH complaints or
that MH complaints develop into full-blown MH dis-
orders. All partners already started working with an MH
continuum model with connected programs and practices
encompassing the whole deployment life-cycle. However,
there is still room for optimization of the connection
between current MH programs/practices and an efficient
application in each deployment phase. Also, there is still
room for new tools optimally suiting an MH continuum
model.
Providing an ‘‘armor for your mind’’ that helps service
personnel to take control over stress
It was expressed that advancement of training packages
for service personnel focused on the promotion of stress
resiliency and attaining control over stress reactions was
needed. Such training packages are already used to
some extent by all partners, for example the Battlemind
training of USA, the BattleSMART training of AUS
and the Road to Mental Readiness training of CAN.
However, there is still room for extension and innovation
of these packages. The largest of these initiatives is the
Army’s Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF) program,
which has been disseminated to more than 1 million
soldiers. However, to date, CSF has not been indepen-
dently and objectively reviewed, and the degree to which
it successfully promotes adaptive outcomes and prevents
the development of deployment-related mental health
disorders such as PTSD is still uncertain (Peterson, Park,
& Castro, 2011; Seligman & Fowler, 2011; Steenkamp,
Nash, & Litz, 2013). Important elements in these pack-
ages are teaching of human stress reactions and stress
normalization mechanisms, how to recognize stress re-
actions in themselves, and to mitigate the impact of stress
reactions, that is, gaining control over stress. There is also
a request for new methods/tools with a positive resilience
approach, that go around talking about MH issues, that
are self-empowering and that comply with military
context to be applied in an MH continuum model.
Social leadership training
There was a growing acknowledgement that MH support
is an important part of daily military operations and
that leaders and commanders play a pivotal role in this
throughout the deployment-life cycle. There is ample
evidence that the person characteristics of military leaders
play a critical role in the resiliency of military personnel
and the risk in development of MH complaints (Adler
et al., 2008; Britt, Davison, Bliese, & Castro, 2004; Britt,
Wright, & Moore, 2012; Davidovitz, Mikulincer, Shaver,
Izsak, & Popper, 2007; Iversen et al., 2008; Johnson,
Grasso, & Maslowski, 2010). Leaders have the power to
influence the motivation, thinking, and coping behavior
of service personnel (Davidovitz et al., 2007; Jones et al.,
2012). Therefore, coaching junior leaders in social leader-
ship can serve as an important preventative effort. Also,
as leaders often serve as role models it has the potential
to diminish the remaining stigma. Moreover, it also can
lower the burden on the scarce MH care providers. The
ways to foster proper leadership attitude and skill
was through the teaching of being a role model (leading
figure), facilitate open communication in the unit, discuss
‘‘lessons learned’’ after incidents/mistakes (facilitation of
sense making). Also creating meaningful and challenging
tasks, monitor the fulfillment of basic needs, including
rest and leisure activities (keeping the unit physically fit),
and lastly, encourage unit members to use the stress
control strategies that are most appropriate for them.
Training peer counseling across all levels
A promising development that was seen was training peer
counseling across all levels. That is, training peers in how
to recognize MH issues in colleagues and how to help
colleagues cope with MH issues. This type of training can
work preventatively as it may facilitate faster tackling of
MH issues within the unit, thereby preventing that these
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develop into more serious MH complaints. This lowers
the dependency on MH professionals. Being rooted in
military context, a peer support system has the potential
to change culture, and in particular to make it more
acceptable for military personnel to admit to psycholo-
gical distress when they experience it, and to present for
treatment when they need it. Most of the partners were
already working with peer support systems (e.g., the U.S.
Army’s Comprehensive Soldier Fitness, TRiM peers,
collegial networkers, the peer support coordinator of
the Operational Stress Injury network, Battle buddies),
but there is room for improvement. Ways to advance
these systems are thought to include: (1) Training of more
peer counselors; (2) Wider/more efficient administration
of the peer support system throughout the deployment
life-cycle, and (3) Improvement of coordination between
trained peers, command line, primary care level, and MH
professionals (i.e., better communication and clearer roles
between them).
Summary and conclusion
This paper described the results of a comparative
analysis of five NATO partner countries (AUS, CAN,
GBR, NLD, and USA) with respect to their protocols
and current practices of MH support before, during, and
after operational deployment. The evaluation focused
on prevention, intervention, and treatment. The complete
chain of MH support was taken into account. Part of
this analysis was to compare existing MH protocols
and current practices, several common bottlenecks for
effective military MH support as well as important
developments.
Our interviews and document-analysis revealed that
each of the participating organizations has many ini-
tiatives to support the MH of service personnel in the
different phases of the deployment life-cycle. Key ele-
ments were identified: (1) awareness campaigns directed
at overcoming the stigma associated with experiencing
MH issues; (2) buddy training and teaching service
personnel how to help their battle buddies meet and
overcome any MH challenges that they may encounter
(e.g., GBR’s TRiM program); (3) specific pre-deployment
training packages for service personnel focused on the
promotion of stress resiliency and attaining control over
stress reactions (e.g., the Battlemind training of the USA,
the BattleSMART training of AUS and the Road to
Mental Readiness training of CAN); (4) peer-support
networks with former operational stress injury survivors
acting as speakers and counselors; (5) assistance pro-
grams that are available 24 hours a day, 7 days a
week for confidential, short-term counseling; (6) addic-
tion and suicide programs focused on creating aware-
ness and preventative efforts; (7) support programs for
family members and other close ones; (8) in-theatre
multidisciplinary MH support teams; and (9) (holiday-
type) decompression with psycho-education and R&R.
Our cross comparison showed that the different
organizations adopted many similar MH protocols and
practices. Also, all strived to use evidence- or evaluation-
based protocols and practices. For example, none of the
participating partners undertook formal MH screening
pre-deployment or in-theatre as there was no evidence for
clear indicators on which screening can be based and the
predictive value of MH screening using, for example,
psychological questionnaires is not supported by evi-
dence. Additionally, all partners formally abandoned
single session psychological (critical incident) debriefing.
This was a recent corrective effort that all partners
undertook, based on the empirical evaluation of this
practice demonstrating no evidence of its effectiveness
and even risks of negative effects on MH, especially for
those who are the most visibly distressed. Instead, all
partners made an effort to educate, and train, service per-
sonnel throughout their career as well as pre-deployment
trainings about MH and stress management. Battlemind
debriefing and battlemind training are new emerging
concepts. Education of all partners was focused on:
knowing how to recognize MH problems of yourself/
peers/subordinates; having proper coping skills; knowing
how to support others and where to go/refer for formal
help if needed. End-goals were boosting stress resiliency
and creating a proper support system in the unit. In-
theatre, all participating organizations took an MH care
approach of watchful waiting and of frontline interven-
tion/forward psychiatry. This meant that all organiza-
tions aimed to treat a stressed serviceperson as quickly
as possible, as close to the frontline as possible, and doing
everything to persuade him/her that his is a normal
physiological response to the stress of battle, and that
after a few days of rest, sleep, clean clothes, and hot food,
he/she will be able to resume his/her military duties. In
order to do this, all partners have an in-theatre MH team/
unit consisting of one or more MH nurses/SWs, one
or more chaplains, and an MH specialist. Finally, all
participating organizations had some sort of decompres-
sion period before service personnel could go on leave
to acknowledge and reward the deployed troops for their
efforts and begin to prepare them to deploy again or re-
turn to civilian life. When further care was requested
all partners had an MH support infrastructure in place.
There are no methodologically sound studies compa-
ring different types or lengths of MH follow-up. Never-
theless, it may be advised that if follow-up is done, it is
best to: (1) use multiple validated MH questionnaires;
(2) incorporate an individual interview with an MH
professional/examiner; and (3) plan follow-up at different
time intervals.
In conclusion, the historical evolution of military MH
care has been considerable and has now reached an
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established status that more than even needs to meet the
criteria of state of the art service. Nevertheless, some
common bottlenecks in current MH practices could be
identified including the remaining stigma about mental
illness among service personnel, and sufficient availability
of MH professionals in theatre. Therefore, across military
organizations a consensus exists about the importance of
delivering MH programs (1) with a positive resilience
approach; (2) integrated in daily military operations; (3)
focused on self-regulation (self-empowering of service
personnel); (4) executed and adhered to by peers and
commanders; and (5) as part of an MH continuum model.
Promising current military MH care developments include
social leadership training and training peer counseling
across all levels. Both facilitate faster tackling of MH issues
within the unit, which lowers the dependency on the scarce
MH professionals. Also, being rooted in military context,
both can help diminish the remaining stigma.
The results of this analysis can be used to develop
new policies and practices that strengthen the military
MH care that the participating organizations currently
provide in order to sustain a good work environment,
operational effectiveness and MH well-being of their
service personnel. Furthermore, the present results can
be used to develop an even more efficient collabora-
tion between partners in their mutual MH care efforts,
whereby they will be better able to face the challenges of
current and future military missions.
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